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Case No. 20050153-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Joshua O. Herschi,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for (1) possession of marijuana in a
drug free zone with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii)

(West 2004); (2) possession of

methamphetamine in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); (3) possession of Oxycontin
without a valid prescription in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); (4) possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1)(b)(iii) (West 2004); and (5) possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the officers comply with the knock-and-announce rule where they
entered defendant's residence only after defendant opened the door 10 to 15
inches, the officers announced their authority and purpose, and defendant
responded by trying to shut the door?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews for clear error the factual findings
underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v.
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ^ 11, 100 P.3d 1222. It reviews the trial court's legal
conclusions non-def erentially for correctness, including the court's application of
the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^ 11,103 P.3d 699.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (West 2004)
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any
building, room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the
officer executing the warrant may use such force as is reasonably
necessary to enter:
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response
or he is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2)....
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
S u m m a r y of Proceedings
On January 6, 2004, police searched defendant's residence pursuant to a
search warrant. R. 6-10,18. Defendant was later charged with four drug-related
offenses occurring in a drug-free zone and a weapons offense. R. 1-3, 36-39.
After holding a preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound defendant over for trial
on all counts as charged. R. 21-22.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home, arguing
that the officers executing the search warrant failed to comply with the Fourth
Amendment's knock-and-announce rule. R. 28-35,49-53,139-50. After holding a
hearing on the matter, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. R.
173-74,178-82, 251. Thereafter, and pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant
pled guilty to all five counts as charged, but reserved the right to appeal the trial
court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 192-203, 207-08.
Defendant was sentenced to indeterminate terms of one-to-fifteen years in
prison for each second degree felony, zero-to-five years in prison for the third
degree felony, and 365 days in jail for the class A misdemeanor. R. 227-30. The
trial court suspended the sentences and placed defendant on probation. R. 22730. The court required that defendant serve one year in jail, but permitted his
release after eight months if accepted into the Northern Utah Community
Correctional Center. R. 229.
Pursuant to the parties' plea agreement, the State stipulated to defendant's
application for a certificate of probable cause. R. 234-36. The trial court
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suspended defendant's sentence pending appeal. R. 232-33. Defendant timely
appealed. R. 240-41.

Summary of Facts
On January 6, 2004, Sgt. Dennis Simonson secured a warrant to search
defendant's residence in Logan, Utah. R. 6-10,178. At approximately 8:30 that
evening, Sgt. Simonson and Deputy Bill Nyberg approached defendant's door to
execute the warrant. R. 251: 7,9-10. Additional officers positioned themselves
nearby. R. 251: 8. Sgt. Simonson wore a jacket with his police badge pinned to
the front 6 to 8 inches from his chin. R. 251: 7-8. Sgt. Simonson knocked on the
door. R. 251: 7,10. Upon hearing the knock, defendant asked who was there. R.
251: 4, 7,10. Sgt. Simonson identified himself by his first name, responding,
"Dennis." R. 251: 7,10. Defendant asked a second time who was at the door,
and again, Sgt. Simonson responded, "Dennis." R. 251: 4, 7,10.
Defendant walked to the door and opened it about one foot wide. R. 251:
4-5,7,10. Sgt. Simonson loudly announced," [P]olice, search warrant." R. 251:78, 10. After Sgt. Simonson announced his authority and purpose, defendant
began to push the door closed. R. 251: 8,11. Sgt. Simonson and Deputy Nyberg
responded by pushing the door in until they could enter the apartment. R. 251:
8,10-11. Deputy Nyberg took a baby whom defendant was holding in his arms
and Sgt. Simonson handcuffed defendant. R. 251:10.
The search of defendant's residence uncovered, among other things, one
bag of marijuana, digital scales, a bundle of plastic baggies, 27 small baggies of
marijuana, two baggies of methamphetamine, two Oxycontin pills, and a firearm
with a 30 round magazine. R. 18.
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the officers did not comply with the knock and
announce rule. This argument lacks merit. Defendant opened the door and the
officer announced his authority and purpose. When defendant attempted to
shut the door, the officers were not required to wait any further to determine
whether defendant would eventually consent to their entry. They reasonably
inferred his refusal from his attempt to shut the door. Moreover, the officer's use
of the alleged ruse (identifying himself by his first name before the door was
opened) did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

5

ARGUMENT
THE OFFICERS' ENTRY INTO DEFENDANTS RESIDENCE AFTER
ANNOUNCING THEIR AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE WAS
LAWFUL.
"When executing a search warrant, an officer must ordinarily give notice
of his authority and purpose before entering the premises to be searched/' State
v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988). This "knock and announce" rule
originated from the common law and is now recognized as an element of the
reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927,934 (1995). It is also incorporated into Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. §
77-23-210 (West 2004) (permitting an officer's forcible entry "if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, there is no response or he is not admitted with
reasonable promptness").
Implicit in the knock-and-announce rule is the requirement that "once
having given the required notice, the officer 'must wait a reasonable period of
time before he may break and enter into the premises to be searched/" 2 Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(c), at 672 (2004) (citation omitted). As a
general rule, "the police must knock and receive an actual refusal or wait out the
time necessary to infer one." United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31,43 (2003). On the

Although generally referred as the "knock-and-announce" rule, a
"knock" is not required. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931,115 S.Ct. at 1916 (referring
only to a requirement that officers " announce[ ] their presence and authority
prior to entering"); State v. Floor, 2005 UT 320,1f 11,119 P.3d 305 (holding that
"the statute obviously does not require that a law enforcement official actually
knock to comply fully with the requirements of the statute").
6

other hand, police need not wait to infer a refusal if an exigency "maturefs]"
beforehand. Id. at 40-42. In either case, '"[t]he interval of time an officer must
wait between announcement and entry depends on the circumstances of each
case/ " State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1261 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted).
In this case, the evidence was undisputed that after Sgt. Simonson
knocked on defendant's door, defendant twice asked who was at the door and
Sgt. Simonson twice identified himself only by his first name. R. 178-79. The
evidence was likewise undisputed that defendant then partially opened the
door. However, defendant disputed the officers' testimony that Sgt. Simonson
announced their authority and purpose and that defendant tried to close the
door in response. See R. 179. After noting this dispute, the trial court "f [ound]
the testimony of [the officers] to be more credible on this issue/ 7 R. 180. The
court "f [ound] that the officers knocked on Defendant's door and when the door
opened they announced they were police and that they had a search warrant/'
R. 180. Based on these findings, the court concluded that the officer's entry "was
reasonable and legal." R. 180.
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's factual findings on appeal.
Instead, he challenges the court's conclusion that the officers' entry was
reasonable. Aplt. Brf. at 5-11. In a nutshell, defendant argues that because he
opened the door under a ruse, the officers should have waited "a reasonable
amount of time for the Defendant to surrender his home peacefully and without
force." Aplt. Brf. at 8-9. Defendant's argument lacks merit.
This case is governed by State v. Floor, 2005 UT App 320,119 P.3d 305.
There, two officers dressed in plain clothes approached Floor's home to execute a
7

search warrant. Id. at ^f 2. Thinking they had come in reference to a lost dog, a
female resident opened the screen door from inside and initiated a conversation
with the two officers. Id. The officers did not immediately disclose their true
identities, but engaged in a conversation with the woman. Id. at ^f 3. After
briefly conversing with her, one of the officers displayed his badge and
announced that they were police serving a search warrant. Id. The woman took
a step back in apparent retreat. Id. The officers immediately grabbed her to
prevent her retreat, secured the home, and executed the warrant. Id. at ^ 3-4.
On appeal, Floor argued that the officers did not wait a reasonable time
before entering and thus violated the knock and announce rule. Id. at f 13. This
Court rejected Floor's argument. The Court observed that where an officer is
armed with a warrant, "'the occupant . . . ha[s] no right to refuse the officer
admission7" once the door is open and the officer announces his or her authority
and purpose. Id. at ^ 14 (quoting United States v. Kemp, 12 F.3d 1140,1142 (D.C.
Cir. 1994)).
Floor explained that the knock and announce rule serves three interests. It
prevents "'property damage resulting from forced entry/" Id. at ^f 12 (quoting
Buck, 756 P.2d at 701). It prevents "Violence and physical injury to both police
and occupants which may result from an unannounced police entry/" Id.
(quoting Buck, 756 P.2d at 701). And finally, it protects "'an individual's private
activities within his home/" Id. (quoting Buck, 756 P.2d at 701). This interest
"deals not with fostering complete privacy but [with] granting an opportunity
for the party to prepare for an outside intrusion." Floor, 2005 UT App 320, ^f 14.
In sum, the purpose of the rule is to give occupants an opportunity to open the
8

door and make them aware that police are entering their home and have
authority to do so, not to obtain their consent.
The Court in Floor concluded that the timing of the officer's entry was
reasonable because the woman's step backward could reasonably be interpreted
as an attempt to flee. Id. The Court explained that "'no interest served by the
knock and announce statute would be furthered by requiring the officer[s] to
stand at the open doorway for [a period of time] in order to determine whether
the occupant means to admit [them].'" Id. at ^f 14 (quoting Kemp, 12 F.3d at 1142)
(brackets supplied in Floor).
As in Floor, the officers here were armed with a search warrant
authorizing their entry into the residence. Accordingly, defendant had no right
to refuse their admission. Id. at ^ 14; accord United States v. Bustamante-Gamez,
488 F.2d 4,11 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The simple fact is that a homeowner has no right to
prevent officers armed with a warrant... from entering his home.").
As in Floor, defendant opened the door and police announced their
authority and purpose. When defendant attempted to shut the door, the officers
pushed their way into the apartment before he could do so. Admittedly, the
interval of time between announcement and entry was very short. However, the
officers could reasonably infer a refusal to admit them or an attempt to flee when
defendant tried to shut the door. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 43 (holding that "the
police must knock and receive an actual refusal or wait out the time necessary to
infer one"); Floor, 2005 UT App 320, ^ 13 (holding that police could reasonably
infer a retreat by resident where she stepped back in response to their
announcement).
9

Once defendant opened the door and the officer announced their
authority and purpose, the interests of the rule had been achieved. See Floor,
2005 UT App 320, ^f 14. Because the door was open, the officers could enter the
residence without destroying any property. Having opened the door, defendant
was prepared to greet outside intruders. And finally, police entry could not at
that point come as a surprise prompting violence in defense of habitation—the
officer, whose badge was plainly visible on his jacket, R. 251: 7-8, identified
himself as police and announced that he had a search warrant. See BustamanteGamez, 488 F.2d at 11 (holding that the rule's "utility [to prevent violence] is
exhausted when the actual announcement is made"). Thus, like Floor, "'no
interest served by the knock and announce statute would be furthered by
requiring the officer[s] to stand at the open doorway" (or in this case a soon-tobe closed door) "for [a period of time] in order to determine whether the
occupant mean[t] to admit [them]/" Floor, 2005 UT App 320, \ 14 (quoting
Kemp, 12 F.3d at 1142).
Indeed, further delay by the officers could only frustrate the purposes of
the knock and announce rule. Defendant was suspected of dealing drugs. See R.
6. As such, allowing him to close the door would give him an opportunity to
destroy evidence or prepare himself to resist the entry. See Bustamante-Gamez,
488 F.2d at 11 (observing that "if an occupant is predisposed to resist an entry by
police, a substantial delay between announcement and entry could only give him
time to prepare").
Defendant contends that the officer's use of a ruse to induce him to open
the door compels a different result. Aplt. Brf. at 5-11. But as defendant himself
10

concedes, use of a ruse by police does not offend the Fourth Amendment. See
Aplt. Brf. at 5,8. The United States Supreme Court has long acknowledged that
"the Government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity of its
agents" in its law enforcement activities generally. See Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206,208-09 (1966). Lower courts have uniformly recognized that police may
use a ruse to induce a resident to open his or her door. See, e.g., United States v.
Alejandro, 368 F.3d 130 (2nd Cir.) (holding that officer's guise as a utility employee
checking for a gas leak to induce defendant to open the door did not violate the
Fourth Amendment), cert, denied, 125 S.Ct. 224 (2004); Leahy v. United States, 272
F.2d 487,490 (9th Cir. 1960) ("There is no constitutional mandate forbidding the
use of deception in executing a valid arrest warrant."); Commonwealth v. Goggin,
587 N.E.2d 785,787 (Mass. 1992) (holding that police were justified in preventing
defendant from closing door after he was induced into opening door by a ruse);
State v. Moss, 492 N.W.2d 627, (Wis. 1992) (upholding entry where in response to
a pizza delivery ruse, defendant partially opened the door, tried to shut it after
police announced their purpose and authority, but was prevented from doing
so).
Defendant argues that the ruse was unsuccessful because he did not
consent to their entry. Aplt. Brf. at 5-11. Defendant misses the point. A warrant
obviates the need for consent. Floor, 2005 UT App 320, \ 14. The purpose of the
ruse was not to gain entry through consent, but to induce defendant to open the
door. Having induced defendant to open the door, all that was required of the
officers was to announce their authority and purpose. At that point, the manner
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of police entry depended on defendant. He could allow the officers to enter
peacefully or resist their entrance. Either way, police were entitled to enter.
Defendant cites several cases from Washington and Pennsylvania in
support of his claim that the officers violated the knock and announce rule. See
Aplt. Brf. at 5-11. But none support his claim. In those cases, the officers' entry
was either simultaneous with their announcement or no announcement was
made at all. See State v. Ellis, 584 P.2d 428,431 (Wash. App. 1978) (officers' entry
was "simultaneous with the identification"); State v. Lowrie, 528 P.2d 1010,1012
(Wash. App. 1975) (officers announced their identity and purpose as they kicked
in the door); State v. Bugger, 528 P.2d 274,275 (Wash. App. 1974) (officers entered
without announcing authority and purpose); Commonwealth v. Martinelli, 729
A.2d 628, 630 (Pa. 1999) (officer entered instantaneously with announcement);
Commonwealth v. Chambers, 598 A.2d 539, 540 (Pa. 1991) (officer announced
authority in purpose after entering the residence). In contrast, the officers here
entered only after defendant attempted to shut the door in response to their
announcement of authority and purpose. The officers thus complied with the
knock and announce rule.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to
affirm defendant's convictions.
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Respectfully submitted November 16, 2005.
Mark L. Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General

frey S. Gray
"Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

Addendum A

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH fliffj »«'i o r^

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
vs.
Joshua G. Herschi, 02-19-84
408 W 100 South, North Unit
Logan, Utah 84321

No.

Defendant
Your Affiant is Detective Sergeant Dennis G. Simonson, a police officer with the Logan City Police
Department in Logan, Utah. Your Affiant has been so employed for over 20 years and is currently
assigned as a supervisor of the Cache/Rich Drug Task Force. Your Affiant is a graduate of the Utah
Police Academy and has received continual training in the investigation of all manner of criminal
activity. Your Affiant has received specialized training in the investigation of controlled substance
use, production, and distribution.
Your Affiant is currently investigating Joshua G. Herschi, DOB 02-19-84 for Possession of
Controlled Substances, to wit methamphetamine and marijuana, Utah Code 58-37-8. Joshua is
currently living at 408 W 100 South, Logan, UT. This is a 'duplex' residence created from an
original single family home in Logan, UT. The Herschi portion of the residence is accessed at
the street level entrance from the north of this white house. The house is located at the
southwest corner of 400 West and 100 South in Logan, due south of the Head Start, Logan
Center at 75 South 400 West, Logan.
The facts tending to establish grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are as follows:
1.

2.

3.

On 1-2-04, Your Affiant received information from a concerned citizen regarding illegal
drag use and distribution involving Joshua G. Herschi at 408 W 100 S, Logan. This
concerned citizen (CC) wished to remain confidential for personal reasons. However,
this person identified themself to Your Affiant and is a resident of Cache Valley.
CC stated that they had personal knowledge that Joshua Herschi has been distributing
marijuana and methamphetamine to various residents of Cache Valley for months, and
was willing to assist in the investigation by pointing out involved residences and naming M ^
involved and suspected persons. T>RO&S oUEfcc S0L£> ILL«S6*ULIJ o>o H~1U(b-03,
(t5f)
By way of background knowledge on the suspect, CC stated that Joshua lives at the
residence with Brooke and her 2-month old baby girl. Joshua is employed at Harrington
& Co. in Hyrum and has no vehicle. Visitors and 'customers' at the residence were
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

named as "Linda", "Dallas", Robert Elsbury, Elizabeth Smith, Katie and Eric Fletcher,
and Carlene, about 50 years of age with brown hair, from the Trenton area. CC has
personally observed drug transactions inside the residence. CC pointed out 2 additional
residences to Your Affiant involved with this group. (One of these residences will go
unidentified in this affidavit, as the names associated with license numbers of vehicles
observed by Your Affiant at that residence on 1-5-04 are drug-related and will be the
subject of a separate drug investigation.)
CC provided Your Affiant with a floor plan of Joshua's one bedroom residence. CC has
personal knowledge of a mid-sized Fire-Safe in the bedroom closet in which CC has
observed several baggies of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.
Your Affiant's personal investigation confirmed via LCPD computer files that Joshua
Herschi resides at 408 W 100 South, Logan. His data also reflects that he was arrested for
Distribution of Marijuana in January of 2001.
CC stated that Robert Elsbury and Elizabeth Smith are transient people in the valley and
that they purchase drugs from Joshua. On 1-5-04, 1940 hours, during surveillance, Your
Affiant observed a tan 1976 GM Van, license number 864MNF, stop at Joshua's
residence. The vehicle's occupants entered and then left 8-10 minutes later. There were
two persons in the van which was registered to Robert Elsbury. LCPD computer files
reflect that he is a drug user.
CC pointed out a residence at 896 W 600 South, Logan and stated the "Linda" lives there
with her father and obtains methamphetamine from Joshua. Your Affiant has personally
had drug-related contacts with Linda and is aware that this residence is the home of Linda
Hyden Folia and that she has methamphetamine involvement history. Your Affiant also
knows that her father was the owner of the house.
CC mentioned "Carlene" from the Trenton area. Your Affiant believes that this Carlene
is Carlene Fite, a current resident of Trenton, whom Your Affiant has personally
investigated for narcotics violations and has an extensive history of methamphetamine
use and has associated with Linda Hyden Folia.
CC stated that CC suspected cohabitant "Brooke" (last name unknown) of
methamphetamine use. Your Affiant reviewed LCPD computer data and ascertained that
Joshua Herschi was named in an assault incident as a boyfriend of Brooke Staggi. Your
Affiant observed a 1997 Mazda, license number 157LYA, registered to Krista Staggi at
the residence on 1-5-04. Brooke's identity was confirmed by Your Affiant.
Your Affiant believes that the infomiation provided by CC is accurate and reliable, as CC
provided CC's identification and contact information. CC has also provided infomiation
that has been verified - nothing has proven inaccurate. Your Affiant noted also that this
information was derived by firsthand knowledge.
Your Affiant believes that probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant of
Joshua G. Herschi, his residence and all outbuildings or storage areas, located at 408 W
100 South, Logan. Your Affiant also requests to search any of the above named
individuals and their respective vehicles if they are present aMhe time of service of the
search warrant.

Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit

This is based on the aforementioned facts and circumstances.
DATED ON THIS THE

i> DAY OF JANUARY
S^^V***—

Sergeant Dennis G. Simonson
Cache/Rich Drag Task Force
SWORN TO, AND SUBSCRIBED IN MY PRESENCE THIS THE
2004.

6 DAY OF JANUARY,

A,
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

Joshua Herschi Search Warrant Affidavit

DISTRICT C p i I R T , p r
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
y n r - i - s pi: t;P7
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff
vs.
Joshua G. Herschi, 02-19-84
408 W 100 South/ Kiotn-i u w i r j ^
Logan, UT 84321

SEARCH WARRANT
Criminal No.

Defendant

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE
OF UTAH:
Proof of affidavit was made before me this day by Sergeant Dennis Simonson that there is probable
cause for issuance of a search warrant, as more fully set forth in the affidavit on file with the District
Court.
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to make immediate search, during daytime hours, with
the necessity of giving previous notice of:
1.

Joshua G. Herschi, Brooke Staggi, their residence and all outbuildings or storage areas,
located at 408 W 100 SouthlLoganTiour Affiant also requests to search any of the
named individuals in the affidavit (''Linda", "Dallas", Robert Elsbury, Elizabeth Smith,
Katie and Eric Fletcher, and "Carlene") and their respective vehicles if they are present at
the time of service of the search warrant or immediately preceding the service of the
search warrant.

FOR THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY:
Any methamphetamine or marijuana material, and any tools, devices, instruments, or other
controlled substances, or any written documents pertaining to the use of, and/or distribution of any
controlled substance prohibited by the Utah Controlled Substance Act. Also any dominion and
control papers, computer records, effects, keys, photographs, and any other items which tends to
prove ownership of said property; which property or evidence: was unlawfully acquired, is
unlawfully possessed, or has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, and/or consists of an
item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, to wit;
Possession and/or Distribution of a Controlled Substance to wit methamphetamine or
marijuana, in violation of section 58-37-8, UCA, and/or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in
Joshua Herschi Search Warrant: Page 1 of 2

violation of section 58-37A-5, UCA.

If you find any of the property described above, or any part thereof, bring it before me immediately
at this court and make a return within 10 days, as required by U.C.A. 77-23-7 and 77-23-9.

DATE SIGNED: Jew)

(A^UV &( J~°0*TME

SIGNED: <f \ (0

(

0tr&- % IJJK '/W

)GE
DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR LOGAN CITY, CACHE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

Joshua Herschi Search Warrant: Page 2 of 2

0, i/U),

CACHE/RICH DRUG TASK F O R i ^
290 North 100 West
K
Logan, UT 84321
JUV:";-.
435-716-9300 or 435-716-9381
RETURN ON SEARCH WARRANT
Defendant: Joshua Herschi
Case#:04-SF4
I received the attached Search Warrant on January 6, 2004, and have executed it as
follows: On January 6, 2004,1 executed the Search Warrant and searched the premise
located at 408 West 100 South, Logan, Utah as described in the warrant.
The following is an inventory of property taken pursuant to the warrant:
Evidence Item #:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Bag containing 15 smaller bags of marijuana
Set of digital scales
Bundle of plastic baggies
Norin Co. SKS, serial # 30446, and a 30 round magazine
One sword
Four Federal shotgun shells
Pen tooter QA)
Three $100 bills and two $20 bills
Miscellaneous items of drug paraphernalia
Two pink "OC" pills
One Winchester 30.06 bullet and one .38 Special bullet
Bag of marijuana
Empty bags with residue
One Tupperware with 12 bags of marijuana
Two baggies of methamphetamine in safe
Sentry safe

This evidence was made in the presence of Cpt. Eric Collins, Bill Nyberg, Justin Peterson, and
Alan Hodges. I, Sgt. Dennis Simonson, the officer by whom this warrant was executed, do
swear the above inventory contains a true and detailed account of all property taken by me during
the search of said address and is being held in the evidence room at the Logan City Police
Department.

Sgt. Dennis Simonson
Cache/Rich Drug Task Force
Subscribed, sworn to, and returned before me this / y~ day of January, 2004.

fudge

Addendum B

Addendum B

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
,

—

_ _

-

STATE OF UTAH,

*
Plaintiff,

v.

*

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*

JOSHUA G. HERSCHI,

*

Case No: 041100017 FS

*

Defendant.

*

This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Each party filed a
memorandum in support of their positions on the motion. A hearing was held on May 18,2004.
At the hearing, Mr. Herschi testified together with Detective Dennis Simonson and Deputy Bill
Nyberg.
There are two issues raised in Defendant's Motion to Suppress. First, what constitutes
"knock and announce" by an officer in serving a search warrant? Second, is serving a warrant at
8:30 p.m. a proper service during the "daytime"?
1. What constitutes knock and announce by an officer while serving a search warrant?
On January 6, 2004, Officer Simonson obtained a search warrant for Defendant's house.
Defendant does not contest the validity of the search warrant. Defendant only contests the
execution of the search warrant.
The search warrant was served on Defendant's residence on January 6, 2004, between
8:00 and 8:30 p.m. The warrant was served by Detective Simonson and Deputy Nyberg. Many of
the facts on how the warrant was served are not disputed by the Defendant. The witnesses agree
that Detective Simonson knocked on the door to the residence. A male voicefrominside the
house responded by asking "Who is it?" Detective Simonson answered "Dennis." The male voice
'1

within the residence then said "Who?" Detective Simonson then responded "Dennis." The door
then opened approximately 10 to 15 inches.
At this point, Detective Simonson and Officer Nyberg testified that Detective Simonson
said "Police. We have a warrant." The Defendant disputes that Detective Simonson announced
that he was a police officer and that he had a warrant. Detective Simonson also testified that he
was wearing a jacket with his police badge attached at the zipper just below his chin.
The officers testified that the male individual on the other side of the door attempted to
close it. Defendant disputes this fact and testified that he did not attempt to close the door. The
officers testified they struggled to force the door open, finally gaining entrance.
The officers then executed the search warrant and found controlled substances,
paraphernalia and a weapon. Defendant's motion seeks to suppress the evidence obtained as a
result of the execution of the search warrant.
As stated, the issue before the Court is what constitutes a legal "knock and announce"
execution of a search warrant? In analyzing this issue the Court must consider the purpose of the
"knock and announce" requirement. Because individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their homes, the Constitution requires an officer to knock and announce his identity
and purpose prior to the execution of the warrant. This is to fulfill an individuals reasonable right
to privacy and to prevent individuals from being hurt or harmed in the execution of the warrant
and to protect the destruction of personal property in the execution of a warrant.Therefore, this
case hinges on what an officer must do and say to legally execute a "knock and announce"
warrant.
Case law and U.C.A. § 77-23-210 directs that a police officer must give notice
("announce") his authority and purpose before he can forcefully enter a house. Therefore, did
Detective Simonson properly give notice of his authority and purpose before the officers forced
Defendant's door open? The Court finds that this issue is analyzed on a reasonableness basis as
stated in United States v. Banks. 123 S. Ct. 521, 524 (2003).
In this case, Detective Simonson and Deputy Nyberg both testified that when the house
door was opened 10 to 15 inches, Detective Simonson loudly said "Police. We have a search
warrant." Both testified the Defendant then tried to close the door. Mr. Herschi testified he did
not hear Detective Simonson say "police" or "we have a search warrant."

The Court finds the testimony of Simonson and Nyberg to be more credible on this issue.
The Court finds that the officers knocked on Defendant's door and when the door was opened
they announced they were police and that they had a search warrant. The Court finds that the
manner in which they executed the search warrant was reasonable and legal. Therefore, the
police officers properly executed the knock and announce warrant, and this portion of
Defendant's motion is denied.
2. Was serving the search warrant at 8:30 p.m. a proper service during the "daytime"?
The warrant issued for Defendant's house was authorized to be served "during daytime
hours." It is undisputed that the warrant was executed at approximately 8:30 p.m. Defendant
asserts that serving the warrant at 8:30 p.m. is not "during daytime hours," so the warrant was
illegally served.
The Utah Legislature has enacted U.C.A. § 77-23-201(1) which defines "daytime" for
purposes of search warrants as " . . . the hours beginning at 6:00 a.m. and ending at 10:00 p.m.
local time." The service of the warrant in this case was at 8:30 p.m. which is within the defined
time period.
Defendant presents no case law or statute that defines daytime as something different.
Defendant simply argues "daytime" means while the sun is up. Defendant has failed to present
any precedence to persuade the Court that it should disregard U.C.A. § 77-23-201. Therefore,
Defendant's motion is denied. Counsel for the State to prepare an order in conformance herewith.
Dated this 15th day of July, 2004.
^;pp23rw

BY THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 041100017 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD

NAME

Mail

A. W. LAURITZEN
ATTORNEY DEF
15 E 600 N
P.O. BOX 171
LOGAN, UT 84321-0171
BRUCE WARD
ATTORNEY PLA
11 W 100 N
LOGAN UT 84321

Mail

Dated t h i s

A

day of

U,LJU

, 20^V

V^

.

Deputy Court Clerk

P^a^ 1

HasM

BRUCE WARD, UBN 7666
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE
11 WEST 100 NORTH
LOGAN, UTAH 84321
TELEPHONE: (435) 716-8361

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

vs.
Case No. 041100017
JOSHUA G. HERSCHI,
Defendant.

Judge Thomas Willmore

It is hereby, ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is, for
reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated 15 July 2004, DENIED. The
warrant was executed on the defendant's residence in a reasonable and legal manner.
Furthermore, it was executed between 8:00 and 8:30 PM which is within the statutory
definition of "daytime service." See, Utah Code anno. 77-23-201.
DATED this %(p day of July, 2004

